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C00002 00002		#.  In  determining  the basic concepts of a theory, it seems
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	#.  In  determining  the basic concepts of a theory, it seems
unreasonable to give observability much weight.  For  both  a  priori
and empirical reasons, intelligent systems may be expected to be many
levels of organization above the basic physics,  and  what  might  be
expected to be directly observable either in the external world or of
their own internal processes seems highly contingent on evolution  or
design.  Of  course,  we suffer the consequence that our theories are
necessarily connected with observation in complicated  ways  so  that
their  confirmation  or  refutation  is  not as clean cut as would be
desirable.

	As to whether a man sees a dog or sees a brown patch, we want
both.   Certainly  a computer program that sees a dog by processing a
TV image will have a relations between its internal state and the dog
and  also  relations  between its internal state and a copy of the TV
image stored in memory.   A proper theory  of  such  a  program  will
involve both relations.

	&.  It  is  now  accepted that the basic concepts of physical
theories are far removed from observation.  The  human  sense  organs
are  many  levels  of  organization  removed  from quantum mechanical
states, and we have learned to accept the complication this causes in
verifying physical theories. Experience in trying to make intelligent
computer programs suggests that the  basic  concepts  of  the  common
sense  world  are  also complex and not always directly accessible to
observation.   In  particular,  the  common  sense  world  is  not  a
construct  from  sense  data,  but sense data play an important role.
When a man or a computer program sees a dog, we will  need  both  the
relation  between  the  observer and the dog and the relation between
the observer and the brown patch in order to construct a good  theory
of the event.